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Gestalt Money 
During the first quarter of 1982 the narrowly-
defined monetary aggregate M-1  appeared to 
signal a rise in monetary stimulus, as that 
aggregate rose at a lOA-percent annual rate 
-nearly double its rate in the preceding 
quarter. The major components of M-1, how-
ever, did not all send the same signal. Tradi-
tional non-interest-bearing demand deposits 
fell in absolute terms, while "other checkable 
deposits" (primarily interest-bearing NOW 
accounts) grew at almost a 50-percent annual 
rate. Can the composition of the M-1  com-
ponent growth help answer the question: 
"Is money growth excessive?" The answer 
lies in whether the growth of N OWs repre-
sents a cyclical demand for precautiona~y 
balances or represents a demand for trans-
action deposits. 
The puzzle on the liability side of bank 
balance sheets does not find a ready answer 
on the asset side. During the first quarter, 
commercial-bank business loans grew at a 
16.8-percent rate-more than double real-
estate growth, and in sharp contrast to the 
stagnant growth of consumer loans. The con-
trast was even sharper in May, when business 
loans grew at close to a 20-percent annual 
rate. Why should this be, in the face of  the first 
quarter's record business-inventory decumu-
lation and the apparent continuation of liqui-
dation in the April-June period? With such 
growth of business loans, why was the de-
mand-deposit component of  M-l so sluggish? 
Simply put, should the behavior of credit, 
both bank and nonbank, influence one's 
views of money-specifically, one's views 
on whether money growth is stimulative or 
contractionary? 
The long and the short 
Let us first consider the demand for credit, 
specifically corporate demand. Real GNP has 
declined less in the current recession than in 
the average postwar recession, but the con-
ju nction of two back-to-back recession years 
makes the current downturn look much more 
severe than usual. Pre-tax corporate profits 
fell by $43 billion in the first quarter of 1982, 
one of  the sharpest profit decl i  nes in the post-
war period, and indeed have fallen almost 
steadily since 1979. This has resulted in se-
vere cash-flow problems for the corporate 
sector. The problem, however, is not com-
pletely cyclical, because pre-tax profits, rela-
tive to interest payments, have fallen ever 
since 1960 (see Chart 1). Tlie current cyclical 
decline is sharper than the 1973-75 decline, 
but pales into insignificance compared with 
the interest-coverage decline which took 
place in the second half of the 1960's. 
Along with this decline in interest coverage 
has gone a growing dependence on short-
term debt. Again there are both cyclical and 
secular aspects involved. The ratio of long-to 
short-term debt has declined dramatically 
since 1960 (see Chart 2). And in cyclical 
terms, nonfinancial corporations have reli-
quified themselves, increasing their average 
debt maturity by increasing long-term financ-
ing during the early stages of the recovery 
period. Nonetheless, long-term debt has 
trended downward in relation to short-term 
debt, making corporate liquidity and profits 
increasingly sensitive to volatility in short-
term interest rates. 
The corporate financial structure obviously 
has become more highly leveraged-and 
leveraged increasingly with short-term 
debt. As a resu It, interest expenses in 1981 
amou nted to more than 40 percent of pre-
interest and pre-tax profits, compared with 38 
percent in the 1974 recession year. The in-
creased corporate rei iance on debt leverage 
at the short end of  the maturity spectrum has 
made money-market watchers of us all, but 
especially of corporate treasurers, who have 
seen their profits blown by the winds of short-
run interest-rate movements at the same time 
that they have been shut out of the long-term 
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Risk premiums and real rates 
With the trough ofthe current recession close 
at hand, we wou  Id normally expect nonfi-
nancial corporations to begin to reenter the 
long-term debt market and extend the aver-
age maturity of their debt. But one need not 
be a Wall Street wizard to see that this may 
not happen, given the high level of long-term 
interest rates-especially real  interest rates. 
Measurement problems are involved here, 
primarily because the real rate is defined as 
the market rate less the anticipated rate of 
inflation, the latter being a major stumbling 
block. But recent history provides us with at 
least a crude measure of  anticipated inflation. 
Thus, in Chart 3, we plot the long-term 
seasoned Aaa corporate-bond rate less the 
average inflation rate of the past three years. 
During the 1960's, then, the real interest rate 
averaged about three percent, and, without 
much volatility around that figure. It dropped 
sharply in the fi rst half  of  the 1970's but began 
to return to trend in the latter half of that 
decade. After 1979, however, the real rate 
rose dramatically and displayed much 
more volatility than economists appear able 
to explain. 
If high real rates are mainly involved, it is not 
surprising that corporations are staying out of 
the long-term market, and increasing their 
reliance on bank loans and commercial 
paper. If, on the other hand, large inflation 
premiums account forthe high nominal long-
term rates, why is it that potential debtors are 
notwillingto issue long-term debtwhen they 
can feel reasonably secure of paying the prin-
cipal and interest payments in the future with 
considerably depreciated dollars? The ques-
tion remains largely unanswered at a theoret-
icallevel. The fact is, however, that corpora-
tions are not issuing much long-term debt. 
The problem is compl  icated by several other 
factors. One major factor is the magnitude 
of Federal-government financing needs. Al-
though estimates vary, the Federal govern-
ment clearly will be running large deficits 
over the next several years, regardless of the 
pace of real economic growth. 
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Secondly, while top-rated corporations may 
enter the long-term market with a bit more 
ease in the future, lesser-graded corporations 
will have to pay a very large risk premium. 
The risk premium of Baa over Aaa long-term 
corporate debt averaged no more than 80 
basis points during the 1960's, but it rose to 
almost 200 basis points in early 1975, and 
since 1979 has often risen even higher (see 
Chart 3). Firms with lower-rated bonds hence 
will have a more difficulttime extending the 
average maturity of their debt, so that they 
will have to increase their reliance on short-
term credit suppliers. Also, with more and 
more firms suffering a downgrading of bond 
ratings this year, we can expect corporate 
demand for short-term debt to remain strong. 
In this environment, policy attempts to re-
strain money growth with a "closed" long-
term market cou Id make the nonfinancial 
corporate sector more vulnerablethan in pre-
vious anti-inflationary periods. 
Unravelling money 
With the Federal government in a large deficit 
position and the corporate sector stretching 
to payoff heavy debt commitments, the 
household sector should provide most of the 
increased saving to finance the other sectors' 
increased indebtedness. The oniy other 
major credit supplier is the Federal Reserve. 
How the monetary authorities "read" the 
monetary aggregates thus will critically affect 
the cycl ical health of the economy and the 
public's long-run inflationary expectations. 
This suggests the need to distinguish the de-
mand for credit from the demand for money. 
Analysts trying' to make this distinction are 
often greeted with the unkind response, 
"You're confusing money and credit." Un-
fortunately forthis criticism, money and bank 
credit aresimultaneously created whenever a 
bank extends a loan. Hence recent demands 
for credit, especially bank credit, and the 
origins of  these demands, such as the drying-
up of  the long-term bond market, may help 
explain why M-1  this year has run consis-
tently, and at times considerably, above 
the upper bound of its long-run target range, 
while the broader M-2'and M-3 aggregates have generally remained near or within their 
target ranges. 
The growth of the aggregates depends on the 
way banks choose to fund their new loans 
and investments. Banks normally fund from 
the cheapest source, causing their liabilities 
to be substitutable with one another. Thus, 
the growth rate for large time deposits (CD's) 
dropped from 30 percent to 9 percent be-
tween the third quarter of 1981  and the first 
quarter of 1982, wh  i Ie the growth rate for 
"other checkable deposits" (primarily 
NOWs) increased from 21  percentto 49 per-
cent in the same time-span. Both the public's 
demand for deposits and banks' deposit-
supply behavior thus helped determine the 
growth of the aggregates in this short-run 
period. 
The recent increase in M-1  growth may repre-
sent an atypical shift in corporate credit de-
mands caused by the difficulty of long-term 
financing, but it could be interpreted instead 
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as excessive (i.e., inflationary) monetary 
stimulus. In the former case, increased pres-
sure to rein in money growth could worsen 
and prolong the recession. However, an in-
crease in short-term credit demand is not 
the same as an increase in the demand for 
money, and some thus might argue that the 
rise in money growth should be offset by the 
monetary authorities. 
The current debate between monetarists and 
non-monetarists once again revolves around 
the distinction between the sources of  money 
and credit. Harold Ross, the famed New 
Yorker magazine editor, once asked a staff 
member-"Was Moby Dick the man or the 
whale?" This question is not far removed 
from the question of whether the recent up-
surge in NOW accounts ought to be con-
sidered the same as a rapid growth in non-
interest paying transaction deposits. The 
strength and duration of  the economic re-
covery depends on the answer. 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial 8anks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.S. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - ad justed 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 





































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
6/9/82  6/2/82 
114  65 
199  98 
85  33 
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Change from  . 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
10,440  7.0 
11,535  9.0 
6,372  16.9 
4,700  8.9 
370  1.6 
539  32.7 
49  0.8 
1,123  !- 7.2 
2,679  !- 6.4 
1,373  I- 4.7 
778  2.6 
15,018  18.7 
14,531  20.5 






Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (William Burke) or to the author ....  Free copies of this 
and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public Information Section, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 544-2184. 